Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will submit my full

paper for the record with your indulgence, and only concentrate on

that part of the paper that deals with the effectiveness of sanctions

and inspections. I would say, however, that I quite agree with you,

Mr. Chairman, and Senator Hagel, that any long-term approach to

Iraq has got to be focused on the political issue of the survival and

the ultimate removal of Saddam Hussein.

The only second comment I would like to preface is, and echoing

the committee’s earlier words to Tom Pickering, Ambassador Pickering

played a pivotal role in American diplomacy toward the Gulf,

as well as my own personal career.

When I was leading inspections in Iraq after the war, and I

looked back to Washington and New York, I could have no better

friend nor wiser counselor than ambassador Tom Pickering, who

led and in many ways formed the coalition that supported American

entry in the Gulf, and whatever I have to say in no way di-

minishes my respect for Ambassador Pickering as a diplomat and

a wise and, I must say, ardent defender of American foreign policy.

There is no reason today to believe that diffusing the crisis in

February and March with Iraq, however, equates to any long-term

solution to Iraq led by Saddam and Iraq armed with WMD weapons.

Indeed, I think, and I applaud the committee for its work today,

the start of any sensible long-term approach to Iraq is to realize

that UNSCOM’s arms inspections are sliding toward irrelevance in

coping with the puzzle of how we in fact cope with an enduring

Saddam and efforts to expand and protect his capacity of weapons

of mass destruction.

We started in 1991 with four real assumptions about Saddam,

and they have all turned out to be false, and in fact I think that

is why the committee and U.S. foreign policy is where it is today.

We believed that Saddam would not continue to rule Iraq after

the tragedy of his invasion of Kuwait and his expulsion as a result

of the Gulf War.

We believed—and it is hard to imagine this today, the extent of

this, but we really believed that Iraq’s WMD capacity was limited,

and not indigenous, and I will just give you an example. Of the

three sites struck during the Gulf War believed to be Saddam’s

total biological weapons capacity production sites, not a single one

was active at the time of the war. They had moved on to other

sites.

Of the 25 sites the inspectors found in his nuclear program, only

six had been struck by the end of the war—struck from the air by

the end of the war. In other words, we did not know, on balance,

of over 18 sites that existed, and I could go on.

We believed that a post Saddam regime in Iraq would surrender

those weapons of mass destruction, and finally, we believed, once

those weapons were surrendered to the inspectors, the inspectors

could destroy, remove, or render harmless those weapons.

Fundamentally, all of these assumptions have turned out to be

false, and that is why we are where we are today, 7 years later.

You know, it is remarkable, the Bush administration had every

reason from an American perspective to believe that no regime

could survive the disastrous policy that Saddam had led his country

into, and that is true for a democratic regime, but it stands as

another stark reminder of the dangers of attempting to understand

and predict foreign societies from our own values.

As I wrote those words this weekend, I had echoing in my mind

the statements of the last 2 weeks of the administration as it

looked at in sharp abhorrence at how could the Indians take their

country down a road of nuclear armament, and how could they lie

to us about their doing it.

We seem to be condemned to learn, every 2 to 3 years, that other

regimes have different sets of values, different cultural mores, and

we suffer if we believe they are like us.

Saddam’s Iraq was and is a fierce totalitarian regime. He rules

by the coercive application of power against his own citizens, and

will not tumble through the force of his own people.

If any Iraqi were to be so foolish as to behave like an Indonesian,

he would not be today sitting in power in Indonesia, as in fact the

Indonesian students have really removed a regime from power. It

would be—and there is historic precedent. This is not a matter of

theory. The Iraqi would be dead.

What is much less well understood, but I think what is really

key to what you are examining today, is the impact that we, the

inspectors, made on the gigantic scope and indigenous nature of

Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program. Over more than a decade,

Iraq had spent $40 billion on its nuclear, chemical, biological,

and missile program. There were more than 40,000 Iraqis in that

program.

The Iraqis’ weapons of mass destruction program by the late

1980’s had become not a foreign program, and that is not to say

that there was not western technology that was key to that program,

but by the time we got to the 1980’s, that was an Iraqi program.

They know the secrets of how to produce chemical, biological,

nuclear, and missile programs. They had mastered the production

elements of them.

The essence of where we found ourselves by the end of the first

year of inspections is the realization that Iraq was not Libya. Iraq

was very much like post Versailles Germany at the end of the first

world war. That is, sanctions and inspections would lose their effectiveness

over time because, indeed, what was needed was less

money than the freedom to pursue, in a clandestine way, secrets

that the Iraqis had learned and did not need foreign support for.

Just given the discussion in the last hour-and-a-half with Ambassador

Pickering, I would like to call to the committee’s mind what

I know Ambassador Pickering knows is one of the discoveries we

made very early on in the Iraqi inspections was that the cover

name for the Iraqi nuclear weapons program was PC3, petrochemical

project 3.

Now, there was a legitimate PC1, a legitimate PC2, and a legitimate

PC4. It was masked in the very nature of the dual use industries

in Iraq, and it was masked to fool the West. I think you are

seeing, as sanctions erode, as Iraq gains the right to impact and

enhance its own petroleum industry, exactly that same process

opening up again to Iraq.

The capability to produce weapons of mass destruction in Iraq

cannot be eliminated by eliminating weapons factories. We can

delay, we may limit in scope, but in essence, the key to Iraq’s ability

to produce weapons of mass destruction is their own technical

talent, and none of us know how to eliminate that.

Sanctions are useful as a means of limiting the scope of that program,

the freedom to maneuver it, but in essence, in Iraq we really

face a political problem that can only be addressed by removing

Saddam Hussein from power.

But let me say a few things about the erosion of both sanctions

and inspections.

I will summarize it very quickly. The crisis of the last

few months, beginning in November and December of last year and

supposedly ending in February, was formulated as a crisis of inspection

rights and meeting unconditional access to sites. Just as

1 David A. Kay led for the International Atomic Energy Agency and UNSCOM, three arms

inspection missions as chief nuclear weapons inspector in Iraq during 1991-92. Now a Corporate

vice president with San Diego-headquartered Science Applications International Corp., he is

based in McLean, Va. The views expressed here are entirely his own and do not represent the

views of SAIC.

sanctions are a tool and not a policy, unconditional access is a tool

of inspection and not an end in itself.

What we have ended up with, and in fact the committee has

heard already the words of Ambassador Butler, we have ended up

in a situation of controlled access masquerading as unrestricted access,

but finding no weapons.

In fact, if you read the report given by the chief inspector after

the last round of inspections, it was that this was a visit. This was

not an inspection. The Iraqis had had more than 4 months to clean

up the sites. We expected to find nothing, and we found nothing.

So in essence we are the point, 7 years later, of Iraq’s weapons

of mass destruction program, the key kernel of it technical ability

being intact, and all that is lacking is the opportunity to gain

money and the irony is that it takes a lot less money today than

it did when Saddam embarked upon this program to launch that.

Very quickly, Senator, that is the essence of my statement.

Well, Senator, most people have forgotten, although I

assume if these walls, or at least the walls adjacent to here, could

talk they would certainly remember, but at the end of the first

world war we maintained 100 times more inspectors in

postVersailles Germany than we have ever had in Iraq. There were

over 2,500 inspectors running all around Germany, and it became

almost a Mikado-like dance.

In fact, the French general who was the last head of the inspection

regime as he left gave a very famous toast to his German

counterpart in which he said, I want to thank you for helping me

not find what you did not want me to find, nor my Government

wanted me to find. It had become a ritualized dance.

And it is well-known now that in fact what the Germans did in

that intervening period is, they trained their Air Force in what was

then the Soviet Union. They trained a large infantry division, maneuvers

also with the Soviets. They developed their arms industry

under the cover of dual-use industries, because, in fact, they had

both the political will to continue that program and the technical

knowledge within Germany as to how to do it. I would argue that

is very much like Iraq now.

The one thing that I think everyone agrees on is, Saddam has

no intention of giving up his weapons of mass destruction. In fact,

when you ask Ambassador Pickering what were the two most important

things, he said preserving, in fact, the capacity to produce

weapons of mass destruction, and the already existing capacity,

was right up there at the top.

So I think it is very much the same, and I would just say, I think

in terms of your question about a legislative agenda and what can

be done, I think the most important thing is what the committee

has started to do, and that is to focus legislative intention on

changes that are occurring and being denied that they occurred.

I am almost tempted to paraphrase President Lincoln in a question

about General Grant in reply to Dr. Pollack. If Baghdad remains

isolated, I think maybe we had better order a case of that

isolation for ourselves. Those of us who have been in the Gulf over

the last 2 years, just as Senator Domenici reported, find, in fact,

that the person being isolated is the United States.

Containment, let me say, is never a policy. It, too, is only a tool,

and to cite our experience in the second world war is to forget the

fact that this country maintained well over 1 million men and

women in Europe for 40 years. We invested a huge amount of

money in the democratic reformation of European societies.

If you look at the Gulf and ask if those conditions are present

today, we have to be honest. We are not going to spend, nor are

the Saudis going to spend, to maintain large American troops in

the region and, quite frankly, many of our allies in that region are

more afraid of democratic modernization of their own societies than

they are of Saddam Hussein.

Containment, we have had containment for 7 years. It is becoming

less effective, and we have just got to adjust to that. It is not

going to work. Containment buys you time, but I think Mr. Perle

is absolutely right that in fact, unless you have a political strategy

to change the political landscape of Iraq, containment will not last,

and you will have misspent that time.

And at the risk of urging one House of the U.S. Congress to look

at what another House does, let me call to your attention to the

statement by Representative Porter Goss last week in looking at

the failures of the intelligence community with regard to the issue

of Iraq, and subsequently of India, I might add. He took them to

task for believing that a covert action only means assassination

and ignoring the important role of information operations, of psychological

operations designed to shape the political landscape.

I think we have largely walked away from the task of supporting

political change in Iraq for short-term things that we cannot do

and do not do well, and ignored the long-term policy.